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SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In July 1990, Jonathan Dale Simmons confessed to having beaten to
death an elderly woman, Josie Lamb, in her home in Columbia, South
Carolina. Shortly after his arrest for this crime, Simmons confessed that
he had sexually assaulted three other elderly women, including Estelle
Simmons, his grandmother. Upon these confessions, Simmons pleaded
guilty to first degree burglary and two counts of criminal sexual conduct.
These guilty pleas resulted in convictions for violent offenses
which, under South Carolina law, made Simmons ineligible for parole if
convicted for any subsequent violent-crime offenses. 1
Prior to the selection of thejury, the State moved, over the objection
of defense counsel, for the trial court to "exclude any mention of parole
throughout this trial."2 This motion was granted, barring the defense
from mentioning parole or specifically asking the jurors if they under-
stood the definition of a "life" sentence under South Carolina law. In the
guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel conceded that Simmons had in
fact murdered Ms. Lamb3 and after a three-day trial, Simmons was
convicted of the murder.4 During the penalty phase, the defense offered
mitigating evidence showing that Simmons' violent behavior reflected a
serious mental disorder. Though there was some disagreement concern-
ing the extent of the "disorder," both sides agreed that Simmons posed a
continuing danger to elderly women.
5
The prosecutor's closing argument claimed that Simmons' future
dangerousness was "a factor for the jury to consider when fixing the
appropriate punishment."'6 The prosecutor asserted that the question for
the jury was "what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our midst" and
further urged that a verdict for death would be "a response of society to
someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense."7
The defense attempted to rebut these assertions of the prosecution
by offering evidence that the defendant's dangerousness was limited to
elderly women, and that there was no reason to believe that he would be
a threat to commit future acts of violence to anyone if incarcerated. In
support of this argument, the defense offered witnesses who were
I S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993) states: "The board [of
Probation, Parole and Pardon] must not grant parole nor is parole
authorized to any prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent
conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for
violent crimes as defined in Section 16-1-60." Simmons' convictions for
burglary in the first degree and criminal sexual assault in the first degree
were violent offenses under § 16-1-60.
2 Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2190 (1994).
3 State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175, 176 (S.C. 1993).




8 For language of S.C. Code § 24-21-640, See supra note 1.
9 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2191.
10 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991) (court reversed death sentence
because the trial judge committed prejudicial error in denying a request
to charge the jury based upon S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640, which would
not allow parole after a second violent crime conviction). See supra note
I for language of § 24-21-640.
employees of the jail where Simmons had been held prior to trial. These
witnesses testified that he had not been violent to any other inmates or
staff during his incarceration there. The defense also offered expert
opinion by a clinical social worker and former correctional employee,
who testified that Simmons would successfully adapt to prison if he was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
Defense counsel moved the trial court to define "life imprisonment"
to thejury according to South Carolina law. 8 To bolster the argument for
giving this charge to the jury, the defense proffered evidence conclu-
sively establishing Simmons' parole ineligibility, offered testimony by
attorneys for the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardons confirming that Simmons' was ineligible forparole, and offered
the results ofaUniversity of South Carolina statewide opinion poll which
showed widespread misunderstanding about the meaning of"life impris-
onment" in South Carolina.9 According to this evidence, the defense
argued that the apparent misunderstanding of "life imprisonment" in
South Carolina caused a reasonable likelihood that the jury would vote
for the death penalty just because they thought that Simmons would be
released on parole, when that was not a possibility. The state opposed the
proposed instruction, requesting again that the court not allow any
mention of parole. Citing State v. Torrence,10 the trial court refused the
defense's proposed instruction. The defense then asked that a "plain
meaning" instruction be given, but the trial judge also refused to give this
instruction. 1l
After ninety minutes of deliberation the jury sent a note to the judge
asking: "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibil-
ity of parole? ' 12 In response, the judge instructed the jury that they were
not to consider parole or parole eligibility and that life imprisonment and
the death sentence "are to be understood in their plan [sic) and ordinary
meaning."t 3 Shortly after receiving this instruction, the jury returned to
the courtroom with a sentence of death.
14
11 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192 (quoting App. 162). The proposed
instruction read as follows:
I charge you that these sentences mean what they say.
That is, if you recommend that the defendantJonathan Simmons
be sentenced to death, he actually will be sentenced to death
and executed. If, on the other hand, you recommend that he be
sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced
to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the balance of his
natural life.
In your deliberations, you are not to speculate that these
sentences mean anything other than what I have just told you,
for what I have told you is exactly what will happen to the
defendant, depending on what your sentencing decision is.
12 Id.
131Id.
14 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Simmons
argued that the trial court's failure to give accurate parole information
violated the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Declining to reach the merits, the court concluded that
the trial court's instruction properly followed State v. Norris15 and that
a reasonable juror would have understood from the charge given that life
imprisonment meant life without parole.
16
Simmons appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.17
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina and remanded for further proceedings, finding that
because the state had brought up future dangerousness, Simmons' due
process rights were violated by the refusal of the trial court to instruct the
jury that the alternative to death was life imprisonment that carried no
opportunity for parole 18 and that an "ordinary meaning" instruction was
insufficient to satisfy this requirement. 19
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Simmons' appeal was argued on three related constitutional grounds,
based upon the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing Skipper v.
South Carolina,20 Simmons argued that his parole ineligibility was
"'mitigating' in the sense that [it] might serve 'as a basis for a sentence
less than death.' 21 and therefore, under the Eighth Amendment, he was
entitled to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. He also asserted that
withholding this information from the jury diminished the reliability of
the jury's verdict that death was the appropriate punishment. 22 This
reliability of determination requirement also stems from the Eighth
Amendment. Relying on Gardner v. Florida,23 Simmons also argued
that his due process rights had been violated because he was limited in
his ability to rebut the prosecution's assertions of future dangerousness
by his inability to show the jury that a noncapital sentence could
adequately protect society.24
Seven members of the Court voted to reverse the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. A plurality opinion, by Justice Blackmun,25 was
15 328 S.E.2d 339 (S.C. 1985) (established the requirement for a
"plain meaning" charge of the terms "life imprisonment" and "death").
16 State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175, 179 (S.C. 1993).
17 114 S. Ct. 57 (1993).
18 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190.
19 Id. at 2198.
20 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
21 Id. at 4-5 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
22 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192 n.3.
23 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding that reliance by court on confiden-
tial presentence report that was not made available to the defendant
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, because it undermined
the right to reliable procedures at sentencing phase of capital trial and
denied him an opportunity to "deny or explain" such information).
24 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192 n.3.
25 Id. at 2190.
26 Id. at 2193 n.4. A brief concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, also rests on the
Due Process right to rebut the state's case for death.
decided upon a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis. The
plurality declined to express an opinion on the Eighth Amendment
arguments. 26 Justice Blackmun quoted Gardner, which held that the
Due Process Clause does not allow the execution of a person "on the basis
of information which he had no opportunity to deny orexplain." 27 Future
dangerousness has been recognized as bearing on the sentencing deter-
mination and the Courthas approved its use in the penalty phase of capital
trials.28 The plurality opinion also stated: "In assessing future danger-
ousness, the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is indis-
putably relevant"29 and "[tihe trial court's refusal to apprise the jury of
information so crucial to its sentencing determination .... cannot be
reconciled with our well-established precedents interpreting the Due
Process Clause.' 30 The Court's opinion in Skipper further supports this
position by noting that the refusal to admit evidence of the defendant's
good behavior in prison is a denial of the Due Process Clause,
3 1
especially because it denies the defendant the right to rebut the evidence
and argument used against him. 32 Although the Court in Skipper deter-
mined that the defendant's good behavior was evidence in mitigation
under the Eighth Amendment, the opinion expressly noted that the this
conclusion was also compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.
33
The State of South Carolina's brief to the Court claimed that giving
information to the jury on parole ineligibility was inherently misleading
because future exigencies, such as legislative reform, commutation,
clemency and escape might allow the petitioner to be released into
society. 34 The plurality replied: "Certainly, such an instruction is more
accurate than no instruction at all, which leaves the jury to speculate
whether 'life imprisonment' means life without parole or something
else."35 The State admitted that the instruction informing the jury of the
petitioner's parole ineligibility was legally accurate.36 To further bolster
the argument that this instruction is necessary and appropriate, the Court
explained that of the twenty-six states that usejuries in capital sentencing
and that provide life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to
capital punishment, seventeen of these states expressly inform the jury
of the defendant's ineligibility of parole. Of the remaining nine states,
three require such information when it is accurate, three have not
considered the question, and three do not give the jury this information.
37
The states that do not provide information on parole ineligibility to
their juries rely on California v. Ramos,38 which stands for the proposi-
27 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
28 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992 (1983).
29 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194.
30 Id.
31 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5.
32 Id. at 8. See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,690 (1986)
(holding that due process entitles defendant to a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-87
(1985) (holding that due process entitles indigent defendant to assistance
of psychiatrist to rebut evidence of future dangerousness against him).
33 476 U.S. at 5 n.l.
34 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2195.
35 Id.
36Id.
37 Id. at 2195-96 n.7. The three states which refuse to inform the
jury of parole ineligibility are Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vir-
ginia.
38 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
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tion that the Supreme Court will generally defer to a State's determina-
tion of what information is allowed to be used in making sentencing
decisions. When a state raises the issue of "future dangerousness"
however, the fact that the defendant would be ineligible for parole
undermines the argument of the State. According to a plurality of the
Court, not allowing accurate information on the parole ineligibility of the
defendant in this situation would deny the defendant an opportunity to
"'deny or explain' the showing of future dangerousness" and "due
process plainly requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's
attention by way of argument by defense counsel or an instruction from
the court."39
Responding to the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina
that the "plain meaning" instruction given to the jury was adequate to
convey the proper meaning of life imprisonment to thejury, the plurality
stated that "[i]t can hardly be questioned that most juries lack accurate
information about the precise meaning of 'life imprisonment' as defined
by the States." 40 An instruction by a court that the jury should use the
"plain and ordinary" meaning is useless in explaining the definition of
"life imprisonment" due to these misperceptions by jurors. The plurality
concluded that even if this instruction had prevented the jury from
considering parole eligibility, the petitioner's due process rights were
still violated, because his future dangerousness was at issue and he was
not given an opportunity to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility.
From the Court's holding, it is clear that under the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if the Commonwealth seeks the
death penalty on the basis that the defendant "would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society"4 1 and the defendant is ineligible for parole,Virginia courts must
allow the defendant, by either argument of counsel orjury instruction, to
inform the jury that he is ineligible for parole. If the defendant is
ineligible for parole, defense counsel should attempt to have the prosecu-
tion stipulate to that fact or be prepared to offer evidence that the
39 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196.
40 Id. at 2197. For a comprehensive analysis of juror's
misperceptions, see Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror
Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death
Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211 (1987); Hood, The Meaning
of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital
Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1605 (1989); Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly
Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1
(1993); Bowers, CapitalPunishmentandContemporaryValues:People's
Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 Law & Society 157
(1993).
41 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
42 Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-297.1, 53.1-151(B) (Supp. 1994). Ac-
cording to § 53.1-151 (B), any person sentenced to die, convicted of three
separate felony offenses of murder, rape or robbery by the presenting of
a deadly weapon, or convicted of three separate felony offenses for the
manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing or possessing controlled
substances shall not be eligible for parole. Also, according to § 53.1-
151(E), "a person convicted of an offense and sentenced to life impris-
onment after being paroled from a previous life sentence shall not be
eligible for parole." At the time this Digest went to print, the Virginia
General Assembly was considering legislation to abolish parole for
several offenses, including capital murder. If enacted, the law would,
under Simmons, require that defendants be permitted to inform juries of
parole ineligibility. The law would be applicable to offenses committed
after January, 1, 1995.
defendant is ineligible under Virginia law.42 Once ineligibility is proven,
defense counsel should be able to argue this ineligibility to rebut the
state's future dangerousness claim and to seek a jury instruction that
explains the precise definition of life imprisonment under Virginia law.
The question of whether capital murder defendants who would have
a statutory right to parole consideration at some future time if sentenced
to life imprisonment should be able to provide evidence of the minimum
sentences they must serve is not directly addressed in Simmons. The
opinion does, however, provide support for the contention that such
evidence should be admissible. As previously cited, Justice Blackmun
asserted that "[in assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of
the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant." 43 He also
stated that "such an instruction is more accurate than no instruction at all,
which leaves the jury to speculate whether'life imprisonment' means life
without parole or something else."44 It is possible in some cases that if
a capital defendant would at any time be eligible for parole if sentenced
to life imprisonment and thejury were instructed of that fact that this may
cause them to vote for the death penalty. However, the minimum
duration of a prison sentence for any capital murder defendant will
normally be much longer than what the average juror believes it to be.
Studies have revealed that people believe that a capital defendant, if
sentenced to life imprisonment, will serve only seven to ten years in
prison before being released on parole.45 Another study found that more
than two-thirds of those questioned would be more likely to favor a life
sentence over a death sentence if they knew the defendant would have to
serve at least twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole.
46
Since a capital defendant in Virginia, barring good conduct credit,
47
must serve at least twenty-five years before becoming eligible for
parole,48 clearing up any misconceptions of the jury as to the true
duration of the imprisonment that defendant must serve if sentenced to
life imprisonment would appear to be the proper tactical choice in
virtually every case.49
43 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194.
44 Id. at 2195.
45 See, e.g., Hood, TheMeaning of "Life," 75 Va. L.Rev. 160,1624.
46 See Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 211,223 (citing Codner, The Only Game in Town: Crapping Out in
Capital Cases Because of Juror Misconceptions About Parole (Jan. 24,
1986) (unpublished study supervised by the Southern Prisoners' Defense
Committee)).
47 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-199 (Supp. 1994). With maximum good
conduct credits, a first time capital defendant could lower the minimum
time requirement to just under twenty-one years before becoming
eligible for parole.
48 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151 (Supp. 1994). Any person sentenced
to life imprisonment for the first time for a Class 1 felony violation shall
be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years. Any person
sentenced to two or more life sentences, at least one of which was for a
Class 1 felony violation, shall be eligible for parole only after serving
thirty years.
49 The plurality opinion suggests that the prosecution may give
parole information when it stated: "Concomitantly, nothing in the
Constitution prohibits the prosecution from arguing any truthful infor-
mation relating to parole or otherforms of early release." Simmons, 114
S. Ct. at 2196.
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Ultimate resolution of this issue is rendered uncertain by the dicta
of the court in both Justice Blackmun's opinion and Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion.50 Based on California v.Ramos,51 Justice Blackmun
stated that the Court "generally will defer to the State's determination as
to what a jury should and should not be told about sentencing" and that
in a state where parole is available, "how the jury's knowledge of parole
availability will affect the decision-whether or not to impose the death
penalty is speculative, and we shall not lightly second-guess a decision
whether or not to inform the jury of information regarding parole.
' 52
Justice O'Connor asserted that the decision of whether to inform the
jury of parole information is generally left to the States. She asserted that:
"In a State in which parole is available, the Constitution does not require
(or preclude) jury consideration of that fact."'53 She cited Ramos to the
effect that "[mIany state courts have held it improper for the jury to
consider or to be informed-through argument or instruction--of the
possibility of commutation, pardon, or parole.
' 54
The plurality opinion by Justice Blackmun helps to clarify this
question. His discussion of a State's determination looks at a state's
decision to withhold such information as grounded in a desire to provide
"'greater protections in [the State's] criminal justice system than the
Federal Constitution requires.' 55 The concern is apparently that allow-
ing this information would somehow harm the rights of the defendant. If
this is the concern, the states should not be allowed to limit the defense
in presenting parole information in mitigation or in rebuttal to claims of
future dangerousness, even when the defendant is eligible for parole.
It would be a reasonable extension of these statements to show that
under the misconceptions held by most jurors as evidenced in various
studies,56 combined with the mandatory minimum sentence require-
ments for capital defendants under Virginia law, that if the prosecution
bases death eligibility on future dangerousness, the defense, by its own
choosing, should have the right to argue and have jury instructions
concerning the duration of time that must be spent in prison, even where
parole is possible. Even though the information might not be as
compelling as the argument in cases where parole is not an option, it is
still relevant evidence that may be used to rebut the state's case for death.
This argument is also strengthened by the difference in the law
between South Carolina and Virginia. Under South Carolina law,
"statutes do not mandate consideration of the defendant's future danger-
ousness in capital sentencing," but "the State's evidence in aggravation
is not limited to evidence relating to statutory aggravating circum-
stances."'57 In Virginia, "the penalty of death shall not be imposed unless
the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is
aprobability based upon evidence.., that he would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society,
or that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman....,-58 Therefore future dangerous-
ness is one of two alternative statutory requirements that must be proven
before adefendantmay be eligible foradeath sentence in Virginia. When
50 Simmons, 114S. Ct. at2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring,joinedby
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy).
51 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
52 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196.
53 Id. at 2200.
54 1d. at 2200 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1013).
55 Id. at 2196 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1014).
56 For several articles concerning jurors' misconceptions of life
imprisonment, see supra note 41, and Straube, The Capital Defendant
future dangerousness is used in Virginia, it is a statutory basis for finding
a sentence of death and not merely evidence in aggravation. This fact
strengthens the argument that the defense should be able to use parole law
evidence to rebut the prosecution's claim of future dangerousness, even
when the defendant is eligible for parole.
The Court expressly declined to address Simmons' Eighth Amend-
ment arguments. The first of those arguments is that parole law evidence
is 'mitigating' evidence which may serve as a basis for a sentence less
than death. Lockett v. Ohio59 and its progeny explicitly prohibit states
from limiting the sentencer's consideration of any relevant evidence that
could allow it to decline to impose a sentence of death. The actual
duration that a capital defendant must serve may be "mitigating" in
showing ajury that life imprisonment is a sufficiently harsh penalty. It
may also be "mitigating" in the sense that it would provide affirmative
evidence that the defendant does not pose a future threat to society.
Though the Court declined to address this argument, its opinion could
still be used to bolster an argument on these grounds by citing Justice
Blackmun's statement that "[i]n assessing future dangerousness, the
actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably rel-
evant."60
The other argument asserted by Simmons under the Eighth Amend-
ment is that by withholding his parole law evidence, the trial court
diminished the reliability of the jury's determination that death was the
appropriate punishment. Though not addressed by the plurality opinion,
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, directly addressed this argu-
ment in a concurring opinion. He stated that the Court determined in
Woodson v. North Carolina61 that the Eighth Amendment "imposes a
heightened standard 'for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.' 62 To assure this reliability,
the capital defendant may demand instruction to the jury whenever there
is a reasonable likelihood that a sentencing term may be misunderstood.
He agreed with Justice Blackmun thatjuries generally misunderstand the
meaning of "life imprisonment" and determined that the"judge must tell
the jury what the term means when the defendant so requests.
'63
This discussion by Justice Souter lends support to the argument that
all parole evidence should be admissible. Defense counsel can demon-
strate, through various studies, the misconceptions of jurors about the
actual duration of "life imprisonment." On this basis, it could be
established that barring information about parole that is requested by the
defense would allow these misconceptions to be the basis of the sentenc-
ing decision, thus undermining its reliability. These factors combined
would violate the Eighth Amendment.
From Simmons it is clear that those capital defendants whom the
Commonwealth convicts on the basis of their future dangerousness have
the right to argue and require an instruction to the jury if they are
ineligible for parole. Simmons' impact is much broader, however,
because it strengthens the argument that all parole information should be
available to the jury upon the request of the capital defendant to assure
and Parole Eligibility, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 45
(1992).
57 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193.
58 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264A(C) (1990).
59 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
60 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194.
61 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
62 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
63 Id. at 2199 (emphasis added).
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that the defendant's due process rights are protected, to assure that all
mitigating evidence is admitted to the jury, and to assure the reliability
of the sentencing determination of thejury. In all but the rarest case it is
imperative that counsel seek to have juries accurately informed of parole
law on all three Simmons grounds. For assistance in litigating the case
and avoiding default where the defendant is technically eligible for
parole, please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.




114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In October 1986, Paul Palalaua Tuilaepa and an accomplice
entered a Long Beach bar and, at gunpoint, demanded money from all
persons within. After one patron resisted, Tuilaepa opened fire and killed
the patron and seriously and permanently injured three others. The State
sought the death penalty against Tuilaepa, charging him with first degree
murder and one statutory special circumstance, murder during the
course of a robbery.
1
In April 1982, William Arnold Proctor entered the Shasta county
home of Bonnie Stendal where he tortured, raped and strangled the fifty-
five year-old schoolteacher. The state sought the deathpenalty, charging
Proctor with murder and several special circumstances, including
murder during the commission of a rape, murder during the commission
of a burglary, and infliction of torture during a murder.
2
A defendant in California becomes death eligible when a jury
finds guilt of first degree murder and at least one of the nineteen special
circumstances listed in the California Penal Code, section 190.2. The
case then proceeds to the sentencing phase where the jury must consider
numerous other factors set forth in section 190.3 in deciding whether to
impose death. Section 190.3 sets forth a list of open-ended subject
matters for the jury's perusal in its consideration of the individual
defendant and his unique circumstances.
Against the California statutory framework, both Tuilaepa and
Proctor were convicted of first degree murder and unanimously sen-
tenced to death. Both defendants appealed to the California Supreme
Court, which affirmed their convictions and death sentences. 3 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review petitioners'
contention that three of the section 190.3 selection factors are defined in
open-ended and therefore vague terms in contravention of the Constitu-
tion and, as a consequence, it was error to instruct their respective juries
to consider these factors.4 Both Tuilaepa and Proctor challenged factor
(a) which requires the sentencer to consider "[tihe circumstances of the
crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding




5 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (a) (1988) (emphasis added).
and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true ....- 5
Tuilaepa challenged two additional factors: factor (b) which requires
consideration of "[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence
or the express or implied threat to use force or violence,' 6 and factor (i)
which contemplates "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime."7
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court found that the California 190.3
selection factors are not unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth
Amendment. In so holding, the Court announced that open-ended
selection factors such as 190.3 (a), (b) and (i) are not constitutionally
deficient if they are phrased in language comprehensible to the layman.
Open-ended selection factors facilitate individualized sentencing, thereby
reducing the risk of arbitrary and capricious punishment.
8
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In rejecting the vagueness claims of defendants, the majority spoke
at length of the capital decision making process mandated by the Eighth
Amendment. This process is designed to guard against the risk of
"wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 9 Essentially, the inquiry is
twofold. First the trier of fact must determine whether the defendant is
eligible to receive the death penalty. If the defendant is found eligible,
the trier must then decide whether or not to impose the death sentence.
Each step serves a different but constitutionally necessary purpose and
thus each requires a different analytical approach.
The threshold decision places metes and bounds on death eligibility
by fitting the crime within a legislatively defined category. A defendant
is cast into the ring of death eligible defendants if the sentencer convicts
6 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (b) (1988) (emphasis added).
7 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (i) (1988) (emphasis added).
8 Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2630.
9 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
